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Arms Imports and 
Third World Growth in the 1980s 
Robert E. Looney and Peter C. Frederiksen 
During the 1980s both defense spending and arms imports declined in 
many developing countries (DCs), especially in the Middle East and to 
a lesser degree in South Asia and Northern Africa1• In large part, the 
reductions in defense allocations resulted from growing fiscal problems 
which forced governments to reorder their spending priorities. It is 
apparent for the developing world as a whole that countries are indeed 
examining the potential benefits of reduced defense allocations. 
Depending on the relative impact of defense spending, the concomitant 
resource reallocation may significantly affect the economic performance 
of these countries. This paper examines whether future "peace 
dividends" are likely to stimulate or to retard third world economic 
growth. To do this, we examine whether (a) military spending and 
arms imports helped or hindered growth in the 1980s, (b) military 
spending/arms imports were associated with changes in external debt, 
and (c) military expenditures impacted uniformly between groups of 
countries. We hypothesize that DCs will exhibit large variations in 
how defense spending has impacted economic performance. In turn 
these variations, it is believed, reflect the underlying health of the 
individual country, i.e., its ability to absorb the. potential adverse 
effects associated with changes in defense spending patterns. 
Literature Survey 
Much has been written recently on the causes and consequences of 
militarization in the DCs. While much of the early work was anecdotal 
and biased toward the standard "guns vs. butter" analogies, a rapidly 
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growing literature has attempted to identify the impact of defense 
spending on various aspects of economic development and growth. 
Many of the studies assumed that since defense consumes large 
quantities of technical and managerial manpower, there will be a 
significant opportunity cost to defense spending. Unfortunately, no 
consensus on the effect of defense on the economy has yet emerged.2 
Even recent studies have failed to quell the debate. For example, 
Biswas and Ram (1986) recently concluded that "military expenditures 
neither help nor hurt economic growth in LDCs to any sign~cant 
amount." 
Another recent interest has focused on causality. While most of the 
early studies assumed causation from defense to growth, Joerding 
(1986) and LaCivita and Frederiksen (1991) have shown that, as 
expected, causality and the lag length (from the independent to the 
dependent variables) differ among countries. 
The economic effect of planned cuts in defense has not been limited 
to DCs. In a 1992 article, Roth (1992) examined how the planned cuts 
in United States' defense spending and the growing budget deficits will 
affect employment in the U.S. Among his generalizations, Roth felt 
that (a) the US economy could easily absorb the displaced workers 
(active-duty, DoD civilians, and defense industry workers), (b) outlays 
will not fall as fast as authorizations and will thus act as a modified 
stabilizer, and (c) the state of the U.S. economy will have a significant 
impact on the severity of worker dislocation. 
Another avenue of research has been to use sub-groups of DCs and 
examine the impact of defense spending within each group. This type 
of research argues that by creating a stable economic environment, 
added defense expenditures may actually stimulate higher rates of 
investment, technological process, technology transfer and hence 
overall growth. Frederiksen and Looney's (1983) study based on 
Benoit's (1978) work grouped countries based on a broad range of 
economic variables to reflect resource availability. Later studies, 
which enlarged the sample, used later data, or grouped countries using 
other criteria (such as savings and investment or foreign exchange 
availability, import elasticity, and investment productivity) found that 
for the relatively richer group there was a positive effect from defense 
on growth but in the constrained group there were statistically 
insignificant results between defense and growth.3 
Dividing DCs according to producers and non-producers of at least 
one major weapon system indicated that producers experienced positive 
economic impacts from military expenditures while non-producers 
experienced declines in growth and investment.4 Broadly similar 
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results were obtained by grouping according to regime type5 or the 
legitimacy of government.6 
Recently, analysis has branched into more complex issues and 
studies have used both time series and simultaneous models estimated 
by two and three stage least squares regression techniques. These 
studies have attempted to incorporate the demand for military 
expenditures as well as their impacts to determine feedbacks from one 
to the other. The results7 tend to confirm the results which were 
obtained by the more naive models discussed above. 
In short, the research so far demonstrates a somewhat consistent 
pattern whereby certain groups of DCs -- usually the more successful, 
the more stable, or who are producing arms -- seem to derive some 
positive impacts from military spending. For the other group, on the 
other hand, it seems that defense spending has little impact on the 
economy. 
A major limitation to the studies cited above is that they are very 
aggregative and any generalizations to a specific country is hazardous 
at best. One exception is Lebovic and Ishaq's (1987) study of defense 
spending in the Middle East. Using a pooled time-series, cross-
sectional analysis on various groupings of Middle Eastern states, they 
found that higher military spending tended to suppress economic 
growth in the non-oil states during the 1973-1984 period. 
Babin (1989) incorporated the time variable since some 
relationships which might exist over the long-run disappear in the 
short-run or vice versa. As Babin concludes, one cannot assume that 
defense spending will have an immediate, or even short-term, effect on 
national economic performance. Along these lines, Kick and Sharda's 
(1986) analysis indicated that an increase in the military manpower 
ratio has a positive effect on infrastructure and social welfare but that 
the impact occurs with a long (12 year) lag. Militarization, whether 
measured in expenditures or size of the military, contributes to 
economic development. 
In summary, although there is no broad consensus as to impact 
(positive, negative, or none) or causality (defense to growth, growth to 
defense, or feedback), there is some agreement as to the channels in 
which defense expenditures transmit impacts to the general economy.8 
These include: 
Resource Allocation Effects. Increases in military expenditures 
divert or re-allocate resources away from domestic civilian investment, 
public expenditures on government capital investment and current 
account expenditures on non-military inputs. 
Resource Mobilization Effects. Increases in military 
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expenditures can influence domestic savings through the following 
linkages: reduced social services, additional taxes, an increase in the 
social discount rate, and inflation. , 
Spin-off Effects. Military expenditure may impact economic 
growth through spin-off effects on human capital (from military 
training, education and modernization) and on investment productivity 
through technology transfers). 
Aggregate Demand Effects. If underutilized productive capacity 
exists, an increase in aggregate demand from military expenditures 
can result in increased output and a rise in capacity utilization and 
profit rates, in tum inducing an increase in investment rates. 
Debt Accumulation Effect. This effect is the impact on current 
performance of debt accumulation from past imports of military goods 
and services. 
Methodology and Results 
Given the conflicting nature of the impacts of these factors, we do 
still not know whether, a priori, military_ expenditures promote or 
hinder economic growth. The net outcome is likely to differ across 
countries and through time. This paper examines the relationship 
between defense (and particularly arms imports) and growth during 
the 1980s. 
Factor Analysis 
AP, a first step, we factor analyzed9 a set of twenty-five economic 
variables10 to get a broad overview of the relationship between 
defense expenditures, arms imports, debt, and economic performance 
for the 1980s. The results, which appear as Table 12.1, indicate five 
main trends/factors11 in the data: 
Factor 1: Debt/Arms Imports. The main trend in the data was 
represented by the high correlation between the arms imports share 
of total imports and the ratio of total external debt to exports. 
Several structural variables, the resource balance and the share of 
savings in GDP (1989) were also included in this factor. The 
resource balance roughly corresponds to the current account in the 
balance of payments. 
Factor 2: Growth. Many of the overall measures of macroeconomic 
growth in the 1980s were highly correlated. High growth was also 




Military Expenditure, Growth, External Debt Variables and Factor 
Loadings with Eigen Values> 2 
FACTOR 
Debt Public 
Arms Spending Military Debt 
VARIABLE Imports Growth Debt Spending Service 
Debt/Exports 89 0.888. -0.190 0.011 0.063 0.167 
Res Bal/GDP 89 -0.803. -0.266 0.052 0.034 0.173 
Savings/GDP 89 -0.798. 0.193 -0.013 0.277 0.064 
Arms Imp 80-79 0.775° 0.008 0.056 0.395 0.063 
Arms Imp 72-89 0.111· 0.032 0.138 0.412 0.038 
GDP Growth 80-89 0.038 0.899. -0.026 0.246 -0.063 
Imp Growth 80-89 -0.078 0.862° 0.080 0.059 -0.065 
Priv Cons 80-89 0.041 0.790° 0.162 0.049 0.157 
Invest Growth 80-89 0.052 0.757° -0.336 0.040 -0.231 
Invest/GDP 89 -0.287 0.547. -0.078 0.363 -0.106 
Govt Cons 80-89 0.186 0.540° -0.227 0.110 -0.219 
Govt Exp/GNP 80-89 -0.158 0.060 0.847° 0.004 -0.063 
Govt Exp/GDP 72-79 -0.010 -0.001 o.831° 0.251 -0.079 
Debt/GDP 80 0.383 -0.069 0.687° 0.128 0.267 
Debt/GDP 89 0.489 -0.316 0.629° 0.065 0.210 
Exports/GDP 89 -0.469 0.050 0.620· -0.128 -0.232 
Govt Cons/GDP 89 0.134 -0.029 0.556. -0.261 -0.221 
Av Milex/GE 72-79 0.082 0.299 -0.087 0.865° -0.049 
Av Milex/GE 80-89 0.075 0.057 -0.287 0.818· -0.073 
Mil ex/GNP 80-89 0.077 0.162 0.379 0.802· -0.046 
Mil ex/GNP 72-79 0.121 0.219 0.336 . 0.787. -0.036 
Interest/Exp 80 -0.212 -0.012 -0.025 -0.021 0.900° 
Debt Serv/Exp 80 -0.199 -0.044 0.006 0.060 o.877° 
Debt Serv/Exp 89 0.436 0.085 0.084 0.108 0.737° 
Interest/Exp 89 0.076 -0.155 -0.089 -0.097 o.no· 
Eigen Values 5.470 5.140 3.464 3.299 2.138 
0 denotes factor loadings over 0.50. 
Source: Authors' calculations based on oblique factor rotation. 
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Factor 3: Public Spending/Debt. This factor depicts the close 
relationship between government expenditures and the overall 
external debt burden. Included in this factor is the share of exports 
in GDP, which may indicate that countries with a high share of 
resources allocated to exports are relatively credit worthy. 
Factor 4: Military Expenditures. This factor primarily depicts 
the % of the central government budget allocated to military 
spending and the "military burden", (the% of GDP allocated to the 
military). Interestingly, arms imports as a share of total imports is 
only weakly correlated with these variables. 
Factor 5: Debt Seroice. This factor is comprised of four measures 
of debt servicing -- interest payments and total debt service as a 
share of exports in 1980 and 1989. 
The factor scores for the 62 countries in the sample appear as 
Table 12.2. Since the individual country scores have a mean of zero, 
they provide an index of the relative country ranking. As anticipated, 
the Middle East countries have by far the highest defense burdens, 
while many of the Latin American countries score relatively highly in 
terms of their debt service burden. The economic successes of the East 
Asian countries is apparent by the Factor 2 scores. 
The next step was to determine the relationship between growth 
and defense for the sample set in the 1980s. Specifically did the net 
impact of military expenditures (a) produce a positive or neutral effect 
in countries facing few relative resource constraints and (b) produce a 
negative impact on growth in those countries which were relatively 
resource constrained. 
To group the countries, we used the Factor 2 score: countries with 
a factor score less than zero were classified as low growth (and 
presumably resource constrained) and countries with factor scores 
greater than zero were considered high growth (and presumably 
relatively resource unconstrained). 
The mean values of the 25 economic and defense expenditure 
variables (used in the factor analysis) appear as Table 12.3. Both 
groups had relatively similar defense burdens, although the share of 
the central budget allocated to defense was considerably lower in the 
high growth group during the 1980s (11.4% versus 15.6%). In contrast, 
the high growth group had considerably lower shares of their total 
imports accounted for by arms imports in both the 1970s and 1980s. 
As expected, income growth was much greater in the high growth 




Factor Loadings for Individual Countries 
t FACTOR 
Debt Public 
Arms Spend- Military Debt 
COUNTRY Imports Growth ing Debt Spending Service 
Tanzania 2.10 0.05 0.01 -0.13 0.05 
Somalia 5.63 -0.49 0.17 0.88 -0.26 
Malawi 0.61 0.28 0.49 -0.85 0.85 
Burundi 1.31 0.84 -0.76 -0.42 -0.29 
Madagascar 0.93 -0.82 -0.80 -0.24 1.32 
Nigeria -0.70 -2.72 -0.57 0.59 -0.84 
Zaire 0.12 -0.10 -0.20 -0.09 0.00 
Mali 1.02 0.98 -0.42 -0.20 -0.69 
Niger 0.31 -1.32 -0.65 -0.98 0.21 
Upper Volta 0.75 0.60 -1.49 -0.26 -1.38 
Rwanda 0.63 0.38 -1.31 -0.64 -1.14 
India 0.50 1.06 -1.14 0.40 -0.29 
China -0.91 2.15 -0.78 2.03 -1.32 
Haiti 0.13 -1.24 -1.04 -0.48 -1.35 
Kenya 0.11 0.61 0.29 -0.53 0.45 
Pakistan 0.67 1.21 -0.42 1.13 -0.13 
CAR 0.61 -0.23 -0.35 -0.92 -1.32 
Ghana 0.33 0.16 -0.86 -1.18 0.07 
Togo 0.16 0.21 1.20 -0.74 -0.41 
Zambia 0.25 -1.11 1.44 0.87 0.00 
Sri Lanka 0.07 0.84 0.27 -0.97 -0.60 
Indonesia -0.69 0.75 -0.63 0.18 0.00 
Mauritania 0.44 -0.50 2.35 1.18 0.32 
Bolivia 0.26 -1.10 -0.34 0.25 1.60 
Egypt 1.13 0.68 2.40 3.68 0.06 
Senegal 0.16 0.29 0.15 -0.69 0.45 
Zimbabwe -0.27 -0.39 0.36 0.48 -1.53 
Philippines -0.36 -0.34 -0.63 -0.09 1.12 
Ivory Coast 0.00 -0.43 1.35 -1.12 1.18 
Dominican Rep -0.42 0.27 -0.78 -0.46 -0.23 
Morocco 0.16 0.60 0.46 0.72 1.10 
Papua New Guinea 0.04 0.37 1.03 -1.44 -0.61 
Honduras 0.20 -0.03 -0.10 -0.44 -0.17 
Guatemala 0.05 -1.59 -1.67 -0.15 -1.17 
Congo 0.11 -0.15 2.37 -0.06 -0.06 
Cameroon -0.06 0.07 -0.72 -0.57 -0.44 
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1970s than the high growth countries (23.9% versus 21.8%) but this 
fell to 21.4% in the 1980s, while increasing to 26.6% for the high 
growth group. As might be imagined, the high growth group were able 
to allocate a relatively large part of their resources to investment, and 
while they had a higher savings rate the differences were not as great 
as those associated with investment. 
Several diverse patterns characterize the indebtedness of the two 
groups of countries. The low growth countries have considerably 
higher debt burdens, both in terms of the total debt/GNP ratio and 
total external debt to export ratio. In addition, these gaps widened 
during the 1980s. However, the debt service ratios do not reflect this 
pattern, with the high growth countries having the highest ratio of 
debt service to exports in 1989. These patterns suggest that much of 
the debt in the low growth group is concessional and/or of a longer 
term nature. 
Other than their rate of macro-aggregate growth, the two groups 
seem to have their greatest differences with respect to their pattern of 
debt -- especially the ratios of debt to exports and GNP. 
Discriminant Analysis 
To assess the extent to which the pattern of debt differentiates high 
from low growth countries, a discriminant analysis12 was performed 
using the set of variables used in the factor analysis. Countries were 
initially classified as 0 or 1 based on their factor 2 score, and the 
discriminant analysis (using a stepwise selection process) determined 
the extent to which our set of economic/military variables could 
correctly classify high and low growth countries. 
The results of the analysis13 indicated that GDP growth in the 
1980s was the most significant variable differentiating the two groups. 
However, the only other statistically significant growth variable was 
the rate of growth of exports -- the seventh and last variable entered 
in the stepwise procedure. The next most important variable was the 
share of defense expenditures in the central government budget, 
followed by the share of investment in GDP, and the resource balance 
share of GDP. Arms imports as a % of total imports in 1972-79 was 
the fifth most important discriminating variable, followed by th~ two 
export variables. Interestingly, none of the debt variables were 
statistically significant in differentiating the high growth from low 
growth countries. 
Our profile of high and low growth countries is therefore largely 
based on relative resource constraints -- especially differences in the 
proportion of resources allocated to investment (domestic resource 
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constraint), and the rate of growth in exports (the external resource 
constraint). In addition the high growth countries devote considerably 
less of their central government budgets to defense and allocate a 
much lower share of their imports to armaments. On the basis of the 
seven significant discriminating variables, every country except Mexico 
were classified correctly and the probabilities of correct placement into 
the respective group were usually associated with high levels of 
confidence. The resulting discriminant scores provide a ranking of 
countries in terms of relative resource constraints (with countries the 
least resource constrained having the highest negative discriminant 
score). 
Regression Results 
Our next step was to determine the impact of defense expenditures 
on growth in the two groups of countries (as defined in terms of 
discriminant scores). To do this, a simple Benoit-type growth model of 
the form: 
Growth= f(Invest., Resource Flow, Military Exp., Arms Imports) 
was estimated using linear regression analysis. In this model, growth 
is seen largely as a function of investment and foreign resource flows. 
Military expenditures and arms imports are added to the regression 
equation to assess their impact on overall economic growth. The 
growth variable (GDPG) is the growth of GDP from 1980-89, and the 
investment variable (GDIG) is the rate of growth of gross capital 
formation. The resource flow, military expenditures, and arms imports 
variables (DEBT, MILEX, and ARMSIMP, respectively) are the factor. 
3,4 and 1 scores for each country. Operationally, these factor scores 
provide good proxy measures since little multicollinearity exists 
between the factors. 
The results of the regression analysis appear as Table 12.4. 
Initially, we estimated the model for the entire sample (Eq. 1). The 
results suggest that both debt and military expenditures contributed 
to overall economic expansion. On the other hand, arms imports do 
not appear to have any impact on growth during the 1980s. 
To see if these patterns were similar for the sub-groups of countries, 
two additional sets of regressions were performed. The first set (Table 
12.4, Eqs. 2-8) gradually eliminated the relatively resource 
constrained/low growth countries from the sample set. The results 
indicate that, as in the case of the total sample, investment, debt and 
military expenditures were all statistically significant in contributing 
·-··--.. -- .. , o oo: .. 1 t : ... L.X .. #4 .. ., .. L I.iii.. 
IBLE 12.4 
egression Results 
Independent Variables -- t-statistics 
EQUATION GDIG DEBT MILEX ARMS IMP 
1. Full Sample 7 .62 .. 3.16 .. 2.52· 
-0.87 
iminating Resource Constrained Countries 
scriminant Score: 
2. < 2.5 5.89 •• 2.10· 3.12·· -1.51 
3. < 1.5 5.01 .. 1.61 4.36 •• -2.20· 
4. < 1.0 4.57"* -0.01 s.26·· -2.44* 
5. < 0.5 2.83°0 -0.74 5.61 .. -2.47° 
6. < 0.0 3.02 .. 0.68 5.35 .. -2.32° 
7. < -0.5 1.80 -1.82 5_33•• -2.51° 
8. < -1.0 1.97 -0.68 5.44 .. -2.06 
:minating Resource Unconstrained Countries 
~criminant Score: 
9. > -2.5 6.21 .. 
10. > -2.0 5.81 .. 
11. > -1.5 5.33 .. 
12. > -1.0 4_74•• 




3. > -0.5 4.06 .. 
4. > 0.0 2.97" 
5. > 0.5 2.80 .. 
:legrees of freedom 
idjusted 
r-statistic 
3.26·· 1.52 0.08 
3.43 .. 1.80 0.08 
3.18 .. 1.68 0.18 
3.16·· 1.40 0.05 
Independent Variables -- t-statistics 
DEBT MILEX ARMS IMP 
3.03 .. 1.18 0.54 
3.54 .. 1.14 0.87 
a.so·· 0.85 0.83 
elf" R2,b F" 
49 .56 17.7 
• 43 .58 17.2 
37 .63 18.7 
31 .67 18.8 
28 .67 17.6 
27 .68 17.4 
20 .72 16.2 
13 .72 12.0 
45 .45 10.9 
41 .45 10.3 
35 .46 9.2 
31 .39 6.7 
elf" R2,b F" 
24 .39 5.5 
17 
.42 ~' 4.9 
16 .43 4.7 
indicates that the coefficient (not reported) was statistically different from zero at the 99% level of confidence 
ndicates that the coefficient was statistically different from zero at the 95% level of confidence. 
ce: Authors' calculations. 
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to overall expansion. However, as more and more of the low growth 
countries were eliminated, the debt variable ceased to have a 
significant impact on growth. In addition, as the proportion of high 
growth/resource unconstrained countries increased, the military 
expenditure term became increasingly important in contributing to 
economic growth. The arms import variable tended to impact 
negatively on growth, although the effect was fairly weak and 
statistically significant for only five of the seven regressions. 
The second set of regressions (Eqs. 9-15) sequentially eliminated the 
high-growth countries and a different pattern emerged. For the 
resource constrained countries, investment and debt played an 
important role in economic growth. In contrast to the relatively richer 
countries, neither defense expenditures or arms imports were 
statistically significant in explaining the overall rate of economic 
growth in the 1980s. 
The relationship of arms imports to overall growth is an interesting 
one. The results found here are somewhat counter-intuitive. On the 
one hand, our results indicate that arms imports retard growth in the 
relatively richer countries (who allocate a much lower proportion of 
total imports to armaments). On the other hand, arms imports appear 
to have a neutral effect for the resource constrained countries. While 
somewhat beyond the scope of this paper, part of the explanation may 
be attributed to the original factor analysis where arms imports were 
highly correlated with the share of the debt burden (debt to total 
exports ratio). This pattern suggests that the resource constrained 
countries finance much of their arms imports through increases in 
external debt. As such, these funds may simply augment or add to 
foreign exchange holdings -- foreign exchange otherwise unavailable 
and consequently of low opportunity cost. 
Conclusions 
Conventional wisdom suggests that large outlays on defense divert 
scarce resources away from directly productive investment ("guns 
versus butter") and human capital formation (education and health). 
While this view might make intuitive sense, it does not necessarily 
follow that increased military expenditures will actually reduce overall 
economic growth in developing countries as a whole. The 
counter-argument for DCs suggests that defense expenditures may in 
fact be an economic stimulus. Military expenditures finance heavy 
industry (armaments). the acauisition of advanced t.echnnloPiP~ 
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military establishment may also attract investment and thus enhance 
the country's foreign exchange position. The results which we have 
obtained in this paper are consistent with this dual view of defense 
expenditures. The findings are also consistent with earlier studies for 
the periods prior to 1980. Roughly the same picture has carried over 
inu; the 1980s: the more abundantly resource e~dowed countries 
appear to have derived positive net benefits to growth from increased 
defense expenditures. For the relatively poorer group of nations, 
military spending has no significant impact -- either positive or 
negative. . . 
For those who advocate cutting defense spendmg to increase 
economic growth, such a policy might not always be successful. As 
Richards and Waterbury (1990) note: 
'We may estimate, counterfactually, the returns on alternative uses 
of the monies devoted to defense, but practically nowhere in the world 
is there any assurance that reduced defense budgets would result in 
increased outlay on say, social welfare or infrastructure. Defense 
outlays are laden with the symbols and sentim~nts of n?tional pri~e 
and survival. People seem prepared to accept disproportionate pubhc 
investment in defense. They and their leaders find less justification in 
using equivalent resources to reduce adult illiteracy or line irrigation 
ditches." · 
Notes 
1. United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World 
Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1990 (Washington, D.C., 
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1991), Figures 2 and 6. 
2. For an excellent review, see Steve Chan, "The Impact of Defense 
Spending on Economic Performance: A Survey of Evidence and 
Problems" Orbis Vol. 29, No.3, Summer 1985, pp. 403-34; see also 
Saadat D~ger and Robert West, "Introduction: Defense Expenditure, 
National Security and Economic Development in the Third World," in 
Saadat Deger and Robert West, eds., Defense, Security and 
Development (London: Francis Pinter, 1987), pp. 1-16. 
3. See Frederiksen and Looney (1982, 1985), and Looney and 
Frederiksen (1986). 
4. Following the classification of Neuman (1984), and Looney and 
Frederiksen (1987). 
5. See, for example, Looney (1988). 
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6. See Looney (1990). 
7. See, for example, Looney (1989). 
8. The following draws on West (1991). 
9. For a general overview of this technique and interpretation of 
results, see Rummel (1970). 
10. Economic variables are from the World Bank, · World 
Development Report, 1991 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). 
Defense Expenditures were derived from: United States Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms 
Transfers, 1990 (Washington: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency, 1991) and World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 
1972-1982 (Washington: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 
1984). The variables(%) include (in order of listing in Table 12.1): (1) 
total external debt/exports, 1989; (2) resource balance/GDP, 1989; (3) 
savings/GDP, 1989; average arms imports/total imports, (4) for 
1980-1989 and (5) 1972-1979; (6) average annual rate of GDP growth, 
1980-1989; (7) the average annual rate of growth of imports, 
1980-1989; (8) the average annual rate of growth in private 
consumption, 1980-1989; (9) the average annual rate of growth in gross 
capital formation, 1980-1989; (10) investment/GDP, 1989; (11) the 
average annual rate of growth in government consumption, 1980-1989; 
average government expenditures/GNP, (12) for 1980-1989 and (13) 
1972-1979; total external debt/GDP, (14) for 1980 and (15) for 1989; 
(16) exports/GDP, 1989; (17) government consumption/GDP, 1989; 
military spending/ central government budget, (18) for 1972-1979 and 
(19) for 1980-1989; average military expenditure/ GNP (20) for 
1980-89 and (21) for 1972-1979; (22) interest payments on the external 
debt/exports, 1980; debt service payments/exports (23) for 1980 and 
(24) for 1989; (25) interest payments/exports, 1989. 
11. Selected on the basis on having Eigenvalues greater than 2.0. 
See Rummel (1970). 
12. Based on variables used in factor analysis. See SPSS, 
SPSS/ PC +Advanced Statistics 4.0 (Chicago: SPSS Inc., 1990) for a 
description of the discriminant program and its interpretation. 
13. The statistically significant variables (Wilks' Lambda in 
parentheses) which formed the discriminant function (in order of 
importance) were: [1] GDP growth 1980-89 (0.569); [2] military 
expenditures as % of central government budget 1980-89 (0.467); [3] 
investment/GDP, 1989 (0.400); [4] resource balance/GDP, 1989 (0.340); 
[5] arms imports/total imports, 1972-1979 (0.297); [6] exports/GDP, 
1989 (0.285); [7] export growth 1980-89 (0.271). 
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